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THE CONSTITUTION AND PRESENT NEEDS
IS OUR CONSTITUTION ADEQUATE FOR
PRESENT DAY NEEDS?
ROBERT L. HOWARD j-
No other question, perhaps, has suggested itself to the minds
of so many Americans in recent years as the one stated in the
above title. Yet there are few more difficult to satisfactorily
answer. The nature and extent of governmental power under
the Constitution at the present time can only be determined and
understood by a consideration of the nature and distribution of
that power as originally provided by the framers of our Consti-
tution, and of the construction and interpretation that has been
placed upon that instrument throughout the period of its ex-
istence.
A Constitution, such as ours, is, and was intended to be, a bare
outline of government-a fundamental charter, so to speak-
setting forth in barest outline the nature of our governmental
organization and the fundamental principles by which its opera-
tion is to be controlled, together with certain restrictions calcu-
lated to protect basic property rights and the fundamentals of
human liberty. As such, it was clearly intended by its framers
to be a flexible and living instrument, capable of adjusting itself
to the vast and kaleidoscopic changes in conditions and needs
that come with the passage of time and necessitate the assump-
tion of new and previously undreamed of functions by both state
and national government.
That fundamental conception was never better expressed than
by two great Chief Justices of the United States Supreme Court
in two important but widely divergent decisions.
The greatest exponent in our nation's history of the adequacy
of national power under the Constitution to meet and deal with
any emergency is none other than the universally revered Chief
Justice John Marshall. He did more to shape the destinies of
the new national government than perhaps any other man, and
he was firmly convinced of two fundamental propositions. First,
that the national government, or the Congress, under the Con-
stitution, had, and of necessity must have, adequate powers to
t Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
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deal with national problems; and second, that the Constitution
was intended to be a flexible document susceptible of being ad-
justed to the passage of time and changing social and economic
conditions and needs. One hundred and eighteen years ago, in
the great case of MeCullock v. Marylcnd' he upheld the power
of Congress to establish a national bank and denied the power of
the states to destroy it by taxation. By that opinion he definitely
established the doctrine that while the national government is
one of enumerated powers, having such powers as are given to
it by the Constitution in contrast with the states which have
all powers not denied to them, nevertheless the national govern-
ment has not only those powers which are specifically enumerated
in the Constitution, but in addition has such implied powers as
are reasonably incident tb the powers specifically granted and
reasonably necessary to make those granted powers effective.
That opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, characterized by
William Draper Lewis in his work, Great American Lawyers,
as "perhaps the most celebrated judicial utterance in the annals
of the English speaking world,' 2 clearly set forth his conception
of the Constitution and the nature of the powers which it con-
ferred upon Congress. He made it clear that the fact that the
powers of the national government as enumerated in the Consti-
tution did not include that of creating corporations or establish-
ing a national bank did not prevent Congress from doing either.
He said
There is no phrase in the Constitution, which, like the
Articles of Confederation, excludes incidental or implied
powers; and which requires that everything shall be ex-
pressly or minutely described * * *. The very nature of a
constitution requires that only its great outlines should be
marked, its important objects designated, and the minor
ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from
the nature of the objects themselves.8
In deciding such great questions of power, Justice Marshall as-
serted, "We must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding,"4 and emphasizing the necessary flexibility of a con-
stitution, he asserted that the provisions under consideration
1. (1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579.
2. 2 Lewis, Great American Lawyers (1907) 363.
3. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 407, 4 L. ed. 579, 601.
4. Ibid.
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were "made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come,
and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs." 5
One hundred and fifteen years later, in upholding the validity
of the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium legislation against the
charges that it violated the contracts clause of the Constitution
and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an-
other Chief Justice gave lucid expression to the same funda-
mental doctrine.6 Any safe principle of constitutional construc-
tion, Chief Justice Hughes emphasized, must take into consider-
ation the social and economic conditions and needs of the time
and place-a constitution must adapt itself to present day needs.
In no other way can social, economic, and governmental break-
down be avoided. The opinion quoted the now famous assertion
of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall stated above, that "A constitution
(is) intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently * * *
(must) be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." A
constitution that is not flexible and cannot meet the needs of
changing conditions cannot thus endure.
Another great Justice speaking for the Court in similar vein
sixty-five years after Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Mary-
land warned that we must ever bear in mind that our Constitu-
tion "was made for an indefinite and expanding future. ' 7 Other
justices have given expression to the same conception from time
to time throughout our history.
5. 4 Wheat. 316, 415, 4 L. ed. 603.
6. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell (1934) 290 U. S. 398, 54
S. Ct. 231, 78 L. ed. 413. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' statements emphasiz-
ing the necessity that a constitution must adapt itself to present day needs
are too long to quote, but may be garnered from the following pages: 290
U. S. 398, 435, 437, 439, 440, 442, 443, 444, 54 S. Ct. 231, 239, 240, 241,
242, 78 L. ed. 413, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432. Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes in
Missouri v. Holland (1920) 252 U. S. 416, 433, 40 S. Ct. 382, 383, 64 L. ed.
641, 648. "When we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act,
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have
called into life a being the development of which could not have been fore-
seen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. * * * The case before us
must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in
that of what was said a hundred years ago."
7. Mr. Justice Matthews in Hurtado v. California (1884) 110 U. S. 516,
530, 531, 4 S. Ct. 111, 118, 28 L. ed. 232, 237. Cf. Mr. Justice Gray in
Juilliard v. Greenman (1884) 111 U. S. 421, 439, 4 S. Ct. 122, 125, 28 L. ed.
204, 211: "A Constitution, establishing a frame of government, declaring
fundamental principles, and creating a national sovereignity, and intended
to endure for ages to come and to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs, is not to be interpreted with the strictness of a private contract."
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It is a common and perhaps not unnatural reaction for those
who are adversely affected by legislation, state or national, to
immediately assert its unconstitutionality. Particularly is this
true where economic or financial affairs are affected. One of the
most widely used constitutional arguments is that a legislative
act is contrary to the intention of the framers of the Constitu-
tion. But strange as it may seem, many who make this argument
fail to take the trouble, by making a careful study of the debates
in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, to ascertain first hand
what the framers actually did intend. A partial reason for this
neglect, perhaps, has been the inaccessibility of those debates
during the early part of our history when reliance on hearsay
became the accepted formula. The only report sufficiently full
to base such a study upon was Madison's notes, and he stead-
fastly refused to permit their publication during his lifetime.
The result was that nearly a full half-century elapsed after that
memorable convention before the report of its proceedings saw
the light of day.8 During that half-century the intention of the
framers was to be learned, by the general public at least, only
from statements of the members made in after-years, when view-
points had been changed by the exigencies of events connected
with the development of political parties.
One illustration is sufficient to demonstrate the importance
of this matter. James Madison himself, who played so important
a part in the great Convention, and who was later to succeed
Jefferson in the presidency and fall heir to the principles of
Jeffersonian Democracy and the Doctrine of State Rights, in
speaking before the Constitutional Convention, viewed with
favor what he described as "that form of government which will
most approximate the states to the condition of counties."" He
further asserted that the objection
against an abolition of the state governments * * * lay not
against the probable abuse of the general power, but * * *
that the general government could not extend its care to all
the minute objects which fall under the cognizance of the
local jurisdictions. Were it practicable for the general gov-
8. Yates, Secret Proceedings and Debates, published in 1821, covered
only part of the Convention, up to July 5, and did not give a full report
for the time covered. 1 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention (1911)
XIV.
9. 5 Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution (2d ed. 1901) 252.
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ernment to extend its care to every requisite object without
the cooperation of the state governments, the people would
not be less free, as members of one great republic, than as
members of thirteen small ones. Supposing, therefore, a
tendency in the general government to absorb the state gov-
ernments, no fatal consequences could result.10
A far cry from the doctrine of state rights! Also, it was
Madison who seconded a motion by Pinckney, "that the national
legislature should have authority to negative all [state] laws
which they should judge to be improper," which he described as
being the "mildest expedient that could be devised for preventing
mischiefs', at the hands of the states. Later he suggested as a
possible substitute a negative on state laws by the Senate alone.'2
And again, Madison was among those who favored, on the floor
of the Convention, a property qualification for membership in
both houses of Congress.' 3
Thus, if we are to know what the framers intended, the only
source of accurate information is the report of what they said
on the floor of the Convention. The purposes and intentions of
the same men as evidenced by word or deed in later years will
not do.
Space will hardly permit any detailed and exhaustive examina-
tion in this article into the intention of the framers as demon-
strated by the debates in the Constitutional Convention, but pos-
sibly a few powers might be briefly looked into.
Some of the greatest controversies in recent years over powers
of Congress have centered upon the taxing power, the commerce
clause, and the general welfare clause.
The power of taxation is conferred upon Congress in broad
and general terms and the limitations upon its exercise are few.
By the terms of the Constitution, Congress has "power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts
and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States."' The same language thus embraces also the
so-called general welfare clause.
10. Id. at 222.
11. Id. at 171.
12. Id. at 173.
13. Id. at 371. Madison agreed with Mason's proposal for a property
qualification for membership in both houses of the national legislature, but
moved that the word "landed" before the word "qualifications" be stricken
out.
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Much was said in the Constitutional debates about the exercise
of the taxing power, and that which was said seems strangely
out of accord with much that has been said in recent years call-
ing for a restricted interpretation of that fundamental power.
The most heated of the discussions on the taxing power in the
Convention centered around its use to prohibit the importation
of slaves, all apparently admitting that it might be employed for
that purpose. To provide against it, there was included in the
Constitution, along with a restriction on direct prohibition by
Congress prior to 1808, the further proviso that no tax be more
than ten dollars per head.15
Thus, to prevent the opponents of slavery from using the tax-
ing power to wipe out a great social evil by taxing the slave trade
to death, special limitations had to be imposed. 6
There also seems to be considerable significance attaching to
the provision against direct taxes, except in proportion to the
census, and the basis of representation in Congress. The North
did not want slaves counted in representation but hoped Congress
would later tax slavery out of existence in the states. The South
wanted slaves counted in representation, for the very purpose,
among others, of having sufficient voting power in Congress to
prevent a tax upon slaveholding so heavy as to destroy it.
The resulting compromise was that, Article I, Section 2, of
the Constitution, setting forth the organization of Congress, pro-
vides that representation and direct taxes shall be apportioned
among the several states on the basis of numbers, which shall
be determined by counting slaves at three-fifths of their number.
Later, in Article I, Section 9, placing limitations on the power
of Congress, and alongside other tax restrictions, is the provision
against a capitation or other direct tax except in proportion to
the census.
Madison, speaking before the Virginia ratifying convention,
and Abraham Baldwin of Georgia, also a member of the Consti-
tutional Convention, speaking in the first Congress, both as-
serted, that the purpose of the provisions in the Constitution
limiting any tax on importation of slaves to ten dollars per head,
and that requiring direct taxes to be apportioned to the census,
14. Art. I, sec. 8.
15. Art. I, sec. 9.
16. Brant, Storm Over the Constitution (1936) 172 et seq.
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was to prevent Congress from laying such taxes on slaves as to
compel emancipation.
17
Madison, in the Virginia convention, addressing himself to the
matter of Congress' power to prohibit slave importation after
1808, said, "A tax may be laid in the meantime, but it is limited,
otherwise Congress might lay such a tax as would amount to a
prohibition."18
The attitude of the first Congress, many of whose members
were framers of the Constitution, is quite significant.
A revenue bill was before the House on May 13, 1789, and a
motion was made to insert a provision imposing a tax of ten
dollars on each slave imported, the proponent of the motion ex-
pressing sorrow that Congress could not prohibit the trade alto-
gether prior to 1808, but "hoped such a duty as he moved would
prevent, in some degree, this irrational and inhuman traffic."' 9
Roger Sherman (Connecticut), a framer, in addressing the
Congress, approved the object of the motion-to discourage slav-
ery-but objected to it being included in a revenue bill. He said
the bill itself was one to raise revenue-the purpose of the motion
was to correct a moral evil-and insisted it should be taken up
as a separate bill on the "principle of humanity and policy. ' 20
Madison agreed with Sherman that a tax levied to correct a
moral evil should not be in a bill whose sole stated purpose was
to raise revenue, and favored "accommodating the title to the
contents.
' '21
It appears to have been taken for granted by the framers of
the Constitution that Congress could employ the power of taxa-
tion for purposes totally unrelated to the raising of revenue.
That it could be used in the regulation or destruction of com-
merce, the protective tariff being not to raise revenue but to
build up or bring profit to local manufacture; the regulation of
morals ;22 and absent special restriction, to destroy the moral evil
of slavery within the states.2 In that connection it is to be
17. 1 Annals of Congress (1834) 1243 (Feb. 12, 1790).
18. 3 Elliott, Debates on the Federal Constitution (2d. ed. 1901) 453.
19. 1 Annals of Congress (1834) 349. Motion introduced by Representa-
tive Parker of Virginia.
20. Id. at 351.
21. Id. at 352-355.
22. Brant, Storn Over the Constitution (1936) 169, 170; 5 Elliot, De-
bates on the Federal Constitution (2d ed. 1901) 447.
23. See Brant, Storm Over the Constitution (1936) Ch. 10, for a fuller
discussion of the debates on the taxing power.
19371
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observed that slavery in the states, like the manufacture and sale
of commodities in the states, like child labor in the states, like
the production of coal within the states, or like agricultural pro-
duction within the states, is a matter peculiarly within the police
power of the states and as clearly beyond any power of direct
regulatory control by Congress. The power was used for other
than revenue purposes many times prior to the Child Labor Tax
Case in 1922.21 Since that time it has been much more narrowly
restricted. In the last term, however, the validation of taxes
involved in the National Fire Arms case 5 and in the Social
Security cases 26 seems to indicate a possible reaffirmation of the
earlier conception. Mr. Justice Cardozo quite appropriately re-
minded us recently that "our colonial forbears knew more about
ways of taxing than some of their descendants seem to be willing
to concede.1 27
The Constitution in general terms confers upon Congress
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several states, and with the Indian tribes.2
It is abundantly clear from a study of the debates in the Con-
stitutional Convention that the framers thought a complete and
plenary power over commerce and trade was being bestowed
upon Congress, which included a power to control all the inci-
dents of interstate and foreign commerce in any manner that
might be deemed for the best interests of all. By no means was
the power thought to be restricted to the control of transporta-
tion across state lines.
Madison, for instance, asserted on the floor of the Convention
that he was "more and more convinced that the regulation of all
commerce was in its nature indivisible and ought to be wholly
under one authority.' '29
When the power of Congress to establish mercantile monopo-
lies was raised in the Convention, James Wilson asserted, "they
24. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (1922) 259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449,
66 L. ed. 817.
25. Sonzinsky v. United States (1937) 300 U. S.-, 57 S. Ct. 554, 81
L. ed.-.
26. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937) 300 U. S.-, 57 S. Ct. 883, 81
L. ed.-; Helvering v. Davis (1937) 300 U. S.-, 57 S. Ct. 904, 81 L. ed.-.
27. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937) 300 U. S.-, 57 S. Ct. 883,
887, 81 L. ed.
28. Art. I, sec. 8.
29. 5 Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution (2d ed. 1901) 548.
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are already included in the power to regulate trade and com-
merce."0
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts refused to sign the Constitu-
tion on the ground, among others, that "under the power over
commerce, monopolies may be established." 31
Space does not permit the multiplication of incidents or quota-
tions, but until recent years the commerce power of Congress
had enjoyed a continuously expanding use without serious inter-
ference by the Court.
The one great pronouncement on the commerce power, to
which practically all subsequent cases refer, is the opinion of Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden32 in 1824. In that
great case Chief Justice Marshall asserted that the power to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce comprehends all trade
and commerce except that which is "completely internal to a
state" and "which does not extend to or affect other states."
Continuing, he said the power to regulate commerce is a plenary
power, and,
like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limi-
tations other than are prescribed in the Constitution * * *
The power over commerce * * * is vested in Congress as
absolutely as it would be in a single government, [one in
which there are no states] having in its constitution the
same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found
in the Constitution of the United States.33
This attitude of the great Chief Justice with respect to the com-
merce power was merely a reflection of his broader view con-
cerning governmental powers generally, likewise expressed in
other great cases like McCullockh v. Maryland 4 and in his memo-
rable speech before the ratifying convention of Virginia.3 5
James Wilson of Pennsylvania, one of the outstanding figures
of the Constitutional Convention and later a Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, gave expression to a similar point of view,
with apparent approval of the whole Convention, when he as-
serted on the Convention floor,
30. Id. at 544.
31. Id. at 553.
32. (1824) 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23.
33. (1824) 9 Wheat. 1, 196, 197, 6 L. ed. 23, 70.
34. (1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579.
35. 5 Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution (2d ed. 1901) 222-236.
1937]
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Whatever object of government is confined in its nature and
operation to a particular State ought to be subject to the
separate government of the States; but whatever in its na-
ture and operation extends beyond a particular State, ought
to be comprehended within the federal jurisdiction.""
That same attitude expressed by Marshall with respect to the
commerce power continued practically unbroken for almost a
hundred years. Little by little and step by step the power of
Congress was exercised to control more and more intimately
various economic and social conditions whose relationship to in-
terstate commerce brought them within the scope of this Con-
gressional authority. During this period it came to be recognized
that the power of Congress thus to regulate included the power
to foster and protect.3 7 Furthermore, matters not interstate in
themselves,"8 or not commerce in the accepted sense,8 were held
to be within the scope of Congressional action if necessary to
prevent obstruction or restriction of interstate commerce, or if
so related to that which is interstate as to necessitate the exten-
sion of federal control thereto in order to protect or make effec-
tive the regulation of that which is interstate.4 0 It was applied
in an important way to regulate the relation between employer
and employee engaged in interstate commerce, and upheld by a
unanimous Supreme Court in the Second Employers Liability
Cases in 1912.41
36. 3 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention (1911) 139, 140.
37. Second Employers' Liability Cases (1912) 223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169,
56 L. ed. 327.
38. Loewe v. Lawlor (1908) 208 U. S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 301, 52 L. ed. 488;
United States v. Patten (1913) 226 U. S. 525, 33 S. Ct. 141, 57 L. ed. 333;
Duplex Company v. Deering (1921) 254 U. S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172, 65 L. ed.
349; Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America (1925) 268
U. S. 295, 45 S. Ct. 551, 69 L. ed. 963; United States v. Brims (1926) 272
U. S. 549, 47 S. Ct. 169, 71 L. ed. 403; Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journey-
man Stone Cutters' Ass'n (1927) 274 U. S. 37, 47 S. Ct. 522, 71 L. ed. 916;
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States (1931) 283 U. S. 163, 51
S. Ct. 421, 75 L. ed. 926; Local 167, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States (1934) 291 U. S. 293, 54 S. Ct. 396, 78 L. ed. 804.
39. United States v. Ferger (1919) 250 U. S. 199, 39 S. Ct. 445, 63
L. ed. 936.
40. Southern Railway Co. v. United States (1911) 222 U. S. 20, 32 S. Ct.
2, 56 L. ed. 72; Second Employers' Liability Cases (1912) 223 U. S. 1, 32
S. Ct. 169, 56 L. ed. 327; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich
Transportation Co. (1912) 224 U. S. 194, 32 S. Ct. 436, 56 L. ed. 729;
Thornton v. United States (1926) 271 U. S. 414, 46 S. Ct. 585, 70 L. ed.
1013; United States v. New York Central Ry. Co. (1926) 272 U. S. 457, 47
S. Ct. 130, 71 L. ed. 350.
41. 223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169, 56 L. ed. 327.
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Likewise, the Court sustained, as regulations of interstate com-
merce, acts of Congress which prohibited transportation of nu-
merous commodities across state lines. The act of Congress out-
lawing lottery tickets from the channels of interstate commerce ;42
the Pure Food and Drug Act prohibiting transportation of im-
pure or misbranded products in interstate commerce ;43 the White
Slave Act prohibiting transportation of women and girls across
state lines for immoral purposes4--all were upheld, and all were
directed to the suppression of moral or economic evils in the
states, in which the interstate transportation was a factor.
45
Prior to those decisions certain states having local prohibition
had attempted to exclude from their boundaries intoxicating
liquor being shipped in from other states, or to prohibit its sale
when brought in, in order to make their own prohibition laws
effective.
In the since famous cases of Bowman v. Railway46 in 1888 and
Leisy v. Hardin47 in 1890, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that intoxicating liquor was a legitimate article of
interstate commerce and that a state's attempt to keep the liquor
out or to prevent its sale by the importer in the original package
violated the commerce clause of the Constitution as a regulation
of and burden upon interstate commerce, the regulation of which
the Constitution confides to Congress.
In 1916, acting in reliance upon the cases just mentioned sus-
taining prohibition of transportation as within the power to
regulate, Congress passed its first Child Labor Law prohibiting
transportation in interstate commerce of child-made goods. By
a division of five to four, the Supreme Court denied that Con-
gress had any such power, and asserted that such a prohibition
applied to the products of child labor was not a regulation of
interstate commerce. 8 The basis of the purported distinction
42. Champion v. Ames (1903) 188 U. S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321, 47 L. ed. 492.
43. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States (1911) 220 U. S. 45, 31 S. Ct.
364, 55 L. ed. 364.
44. Hoke v. United States (1913) 227 U. S. 308, 33 S. Ct. 281, 57 L. ed.
523; Caminetti v. United States (1917) 242 U. S. 470, 37 S. Ct. 192, 61
L. ed. 442.
45. Cf. Brooks v. United States (1925) 267 U. S. 432, 45 S. Ct. 345, 69
L. ed. 699.
46. Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1888) 125 U. S. 465, 8 S. Ct.
689, 31 L. ed. 700.
47. 135 U. S. 100, 10 S. Ct. 681, 34 L. ed. 128.
48. Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L. ed.
1101.
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from the Lottery, White Slave, and Pure Food and Drugs cases
was, to say the least, confusing. In those cases the purpose was
said to be to protect from evil the states into which shipment
was made, the interstate transportation being necessary to the
evil, and that was held to constitute a regulation of interstate
commerce within the power of Congress. In the Child Labor
case, completely ignoring the economic evil produced in the state
into which the goods were shipped, the Court said the purpose
was solely to alleviate evil in the state from which the shipment
was made and which preceded the transportation. This was held
not to be a regulation of interstate commerce, and thus invalid.
The distinction has been criticised by many, as it was by the dis-
senting judges, as being neither accurate in fact nor sound in
theory. It stands today, however, after nineteen years as good
law of the Supreme Court, though several cases subsequently
decided seem to destroy completely the basis on which it purported
to stand.49 Thus we have the paradoxical spectacle of the states
being without power to prohibit the importation, as was decided
in the case of liquor just mentioned, because it is a regulation
of interstate commerce, the national government lacking the
power because it is not a regulation of interstate commerce. The
niceties of reasoning by which the majority of the Court have
purported to distinguish this case from others that have gone
before, as well as some more recently determined, scarcely sat-
isfy the Court itself and have left the average student uncon-
vinced that the earlier doctrines of Marshall and of the founding
fathers have not been departed from.
The result, of course, is our now thirteen year old attempt to
adopt a Child Labor Amendment, the ultimate success of which
is, to say the least, somewhat doubtful.
It would expend this article to undue length to attempt a com-
plete and detailed review of all the more recent cases further
49. Brooks v. United States (1925) 267 U. S. 432, 45 S. Ct. 345, 69 L. ed.
699; Gooch v. United States (1936) 297 U. S. 124, 57 S. Ct. 395, 80 L. ed.
522; Bailey v. United States (C. C. A. 10, 1934) 74 F. (2d) 451. Cf. In re
Rahrer (1891) 140 U. S. 545, 11 S. Ct. 865, 35 L. ed. 572; Clark Distilling
Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co. (1917) 242 U. S. 311, 37 S. Ct. 180, 61
L. ed. 326; United States v. Hill (1919) 248 U. S. 420, 39 S. Ct. 143, 63
L. ed. 337; Whitfield v. Ohio (1936) 297 U. S. 431, 56 S. Ct. 532, 80 L. ed.
778; Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co. (1937) 299
U. S. 334, 57 S. Ct. 277, 81 L. ed.- See Corwin, The Power of Congress
to Prohibit Commerce (1933) 18 Corn. L. Q. 477.
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restricting the commerce power of Congress, though it may be
noted in passing that in the Railroad Retirement case" of 1935,
the Court again by a five to four division, and after a holding
of invalidity on due process grounds, seemed to go out of its way
to assert that no plan of compulsory retirement for employees
in interstate commerce, involving the railways pensioning those
retired, however reasonable in its provisions, could be a regula-
tion of the interstate commerce in which those employees and
their employers are engaged, so as to be within the power of
Congress to enact. 51 The attitude of the five members of the
Court making up the majority in that case, was quite obviously
out of accord with that set forth in the unanimous opinion
twenty-three years earlier in the Second Employers' Liability
Cases referred to above.
52
Among other recent cases that have appeared to narrow the
previous application of the commerce power may be mentioned
the Schechter case5" involving the National Industrial Recovery
Act, the invalidity of which was unanimously asserted because
of too broad a delegation of power to the executive. The opinion
is commonly thought to have gone beyond what was necessary
to a decision by attempting to set up a direct and indirect test
for determining what so affects interstate commerce as to bring
it within the regulatory power of Congress.5 4 The practical
weakness of any such test and its restricting effect upon the
power of Congress was clearly brought out in the dissent in the
Guffey Coal case 55 in which the Court again so sharply divided.
The use of any such test was completely abandoned in the recent
Railroad Labor 56 and Wagner Labor Relations 5'7 cases which are
50. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co. (1935) 295 U. S. 330,
55 S. Ct. 758, 79 L. ed. 1468.
51. See Powell, Commerce, Pensions, and Codes (1935) 49 Harv. L. Rev.
1, 193.
52. (1912) 223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169, 56 L. ed. 327.
53. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) 295 U. S.
495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. ed. 1570.
54. Powell, Commerce, Pensions, and Codes (1935) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
193.
55. Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936) 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80
L. ed. 1160.
56. Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40 (1937) 300 U. S.-,
57 S. Ct. 592, 81 L. ed.-.
57. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
(1937) 300 U. S.-, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed.-; National Labor Relations
Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co. (1937) 300 U. S.-, 57 S. Ct. 642, 81
L. ed.-; National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Cloth-
ing Co. (1937) 300 U. S.-, 57 S. Ct. 645, 81 L. ed.-.
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fundamentally contrary to the Guffey Coal case, the Railroad
Retirement case, and that part of the N. R. A. case just men-
tioned.
The general welfare clause of the Constitution, providing that
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes to provide for
the general welfare of the United States, has been the basis of
innumerable acts of Congress appropriating public funds for an
ever widening list of purposes, many of which manifestly were
not directly contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, but
clearly within the spirit and purpose which prompted the origi-
nal formulation of the clause.
Without purporting authoritatively to define the meaning or
limits of this provision of the Constitution, all departments of
the government have uniformly supported a steadily expanding
use of the power to appropriate for the general welfare. Prac-
tically all undertakings of the Department of Agriculture, as
well as the creation of the Department itself, together with vari-
ous schemes of federal aid to the states, always upon specified
conditions, have been based upon this provision of the Constitu-
tion.58 It remained, however, for the year 1936 to give us an
express Supreme Court determination of the meaning of that
clause in a decision that has perhaps received more adverse criti-
cism than any since the ill-fated Dred Scott decision"° just prior
to the Civil War.
For the first time, the Court authoritatively decided that the
doctrine early asserted by Hamilton and Story"° set forth the
proper interpretation. By this doctrine it was asserted that the
general welfare clause confers upon Congress a power separate
and distinct from the later enumerated powers, on the basis of
which Congress has a substantive power to tax and to appropri-
ate, limited only by the requirement that such powers shall be
exercised to provide for the general welfare of the United States
as distinguished from local welfare. Without doubt this was the
conception put upon the clause by the framers of the Constitu-
tion. This, at first glance, appeared to be a very far-reaching
and important determination, but the application of that doc-
58. 1 Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States (2d ed. 1929)
97 et seq.; Brant, Storm Over the Constitution (1936) Ch. 9.
59. Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857) 19 How. 393, 15 L. ed. 691.
60. 1 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (3d ed. 1858) Ch. 14,
p. 639 et seq.
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trine by the Court majority to the processing taxes involved in
the famous A. A. A. case 61 largely destroyed its meaning. It
seemed in reality to repudiate this Hamilton-Story doctrine and
to give full application to that originally advocated by Madison,
62
that the general welfare clause, in effect, had no purpose but to
occupy space, and that the power to tax and spend is directly
limited to what is incident to the execution of the other enumer-
ated powers of Congress-a power which Congress clearly would
have had without the general welfare clause.
The power of Congress to levy an excise tax upon the process-
ing of agricultural products was not questioned. Neither was
the power to appropriate money for the benefit of agriculture.
But the incidental power of exacting a promise to comply with
the plan of acreage reduction in return for benefit payments,
deemed necessary to make the broader plan really effective in
behalf of the general welfare, was held to constitute an invasion
of state rights and to invalidate the whole scheme.
As to the power to lay and collect taxes to provide for the gen-
eral welfare, just as in the case of all other enumerated powers,
the majority admitted that the Constitutional provision confers
a substantive power, not limited to being exercised as incidental
to the later enumerated powers, as was contended for by attor-
neys for the processors.
For the preceding 117 years, since the opinion of Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall in the famous case of McCulloch v. Maryland,3
it had been uniformly recognized that all enumerated powers
carry with them such incidental powers as may be necessary and
proper to make the granted powers effective. That doctrine,
never previously departed from, had been, within a year, reas-
serted in its full vigor by the Court in a most far-reaching opin-
ion in the famous Gold cases.6 4
The effect of Mr. Justice Roberts' majority opinion in the
A. A. A. case, by denying that the power involved carries with
it the reasonable incidents necessary to make the granted power
61. United States v. Butler (1936) 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. ed.
477.
62. 1 Story, Commentar es on the Constitution (3d ed. 1858) Ch. 14.
63. (1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 4'L. ed. 579.
64. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. (1935) 294 U. S. 240, 55 S. Ct.
407, 79 L. ed. 885; Nortz v. United States (1935) 294 U. S. 317, 55 S. Ct.
428, 79 L. ed. 907; Perry v. United States (1935) 294 U. S. 330, 55 S. Ct.
432, 79 L. ed. 912.
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effective, was to repudiate completely his own opening pronounce-
ment that Hamilton and Story were right in asserting that the
general welfare clause does constitute a substantive grant of
power not limited by the enumerated powers which follow, and
to deny application of Marshall's doctrine of implied powers to
this provision of the Constitution.
Thus, while the general welfare clause was given a very broad
scope when the Court was formulating its definition, when it
came to its actual application it was restricted within extremely
narrow limits. 65 As a result, we were to find that at a time when
urgent economic problems affecting the nation as a whole and
beyond the capacity of the individual states to control were call-
ing for solution, the general welfare clause and the commerce
clause, upon which the national government so largely depends
for power to act, were being denied effective application by the
Court.
It is a matter of no little interest to note in this connection
that a proposed amendment to the Constitution was introduced
in the last Congress declaring it to be "the intent of the Consti-
tution that the legislative powers therein granted shall not be
considered as diminished by any implied limitation * * * and shall
embrace all powers that reasonably can be implied from the
powers * * * expressly set forth."6' 6 The purpose clearly is two-
fold-to restore Marshall's doctrine of implied powers estab-
lished by McCulloch v. Maryland, and also to re-establish his
doctrine that powers granted may, as he said in the case of the
commerce power, "be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowl-
edge no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitu-
tion.' '6Z The effect of adopting such an amendment would have
been to destroy the doctrine of implied limitations developed with
and since the Child Labor cases, and require that those cases
and the A. A. A. case, among others, be reversed.
One other field of controversy should be mentioned in this
general survey, and that is the status of the due process of law
65. For a more complete discussion of this problem by the present writer,
see Howard, The Supreme Court, the Constitution, and the A. A. A. (1937)
25 Ky. L. J. 291.
66. Introduced by Representative Eicher of Iowa, February 25, 1937.
H. J. Res. 248. Dig. Pub. Gen. Bills, 75th Cong., 1st. Sess., No. 5, p. 209;
St. Louis Star-Times, March 3, 1937, p. 4: 1.
67. Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 9 Wheat. 1, 196, 6 L. ed. 23, 70.
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clauses contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
one restricts the power of the national government, the other
that of the states, and both provide that no person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
The clause has been said by the Court to mean the same as its
English counterpart-law of the land-in Magna Carta, from
which it was derived. That English counterpart had, and still
has, the sole purpose of guaranteeing proper methods of proce-
dure. Such, also, has generally been conceded to have been the
purpose and original meaning of the due process clause in the
Amendments to our Constitution-the one adopted in 1791 and
the other in 1868. But step by step in recent years the scope of
application of the due process provision has been broadened by
judicial decision until it no longer even remotely resembles its
English counterpart.
In 1897, more than a hundred years after the adoption of the
Fourteenth and thirty years after the Fifth Amendment, the
Supreme Court, for the first time, broadened the term "liberty"
to include liberty of contract. 8 Still later liberty of contract was
held to be a property right,69 and as such, along with other prop-
erty rights, guaranteed to corporations as well as to natural
persons.70
By this process of gradual judicial expansion, the due process
clause has become the basis upon which the courts pass upon the
merits of all legislative enactments, state and national, holding
them valid or invalid by nothing more definite than the general
standard of reasonableness.
When social and economic legislation involving controversial
matters of policy is under consideration, whether one determines
a measure to be a reasonable exercise of a state's police power,
for instance, or an arbitrary and unreasonable interference with
private rights, not infrequently depends upon the social and eco-
nomic outlook of the person (in this case the judge) making the
determination.
68. Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) 165 U. S. 578, 17 S. Ct. 427, 41 L. ed.
832.
69. Holden v. Hardy (1898) 169 U. S. 366, 18 S. Ct. 383, 42 L. ed. 780.
70. Covington & Louisville Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford (1896) 164
U. S. 578, 17 S. Ct. 198, 41 L. ed. 560; Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Para-
mount Auto Exchange (1923) 262 U. S. 544, 43 S. Ct. 636, 67 L. ed. 1112;
Quaker City Cab. Co. v. Pennsylvania (1928) 277 U. S. 389, 48 S. Ct. 553,
72 L. ed. 927. See 3 Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States
(2d ed. 1929) Ch. 91.
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Such indefinite standards as due process of law, like that of the
general welfare clause involved in the A. A. A. case, having no
certain and definite meaning, must be viewed as highly flexible
and readily adaptable to changing conditions and needs, and a
court must use great care in their application lest it substitute
its judgment as to the wisdom and desirability of legislative acts
for the judgment of the constitutionally created legislative bodies
whose function it is to determine matters of policy. It has been
in cases involving application of such provisions of the Constitu-
tion that the Court has most sharply divided. It is this situation
which impelled Mr. Justice Stone in his dissent in the New York
Minimum Wage case to charge that the majority were deciding
the case on the ground of their "own personal economic predilec-
tions" 71 rather than by any compelling force in the Constitution,
and again, in the A. A. A. case, to warn the majority against
what he described as government by "judicial fiat," and the
employment of a "tortured construction of the Constitution" to
arrive at a conclusion in harmony with ideas of desirability
entertained by a majority in sympathy with the notion that it is
"the business of Courts to sit in judgment on the wisdom of
legislative action."'72
Further he asserted that the "courts are not the only agency
of government that must be assumed to have the capacity to
govern," and, like Mr. Justice Brandeis in an earlier dissent,
thought the Court was setting itself up as a super-legislature,'
exercising a veto power upon acts of Congress and the state
legislatures alike. It was Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his memorable
dissent a few years ago in the New State Ice Company case, who
caustically warned the Court against erecting its own "prejudices
into legal principles." 74
It was by application of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment that the Supreme Court outlawed several
state taxing provisions a few years ago, all of which had long
been recognized, judicially and otherwise, as valid methods of
71. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo (1936) 298 U. S. 587, 633,
56 S. Ct. 918, 933, 80 L. ed. 1347, 1367.
72. United States v. Butler (1936) 297 U. S. 1, 87, 56 S. Ct. 312, 328,
329, 80 L. ed. 477, 499.
73. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (1932) 285 U. S. 262, 300, 52 S. Ct.
371, 383, 76 L. ed. 747, 766.
74. See 285 U. S. at 311, 52 S. Ct. at 387, 76 L. ed. at 771.
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raising revenue. In his dissent in the leading case of Baldwin v.
Missouri, Mr. Justice Holmes gave lucid expression to what he
considered a serious error by the Court majority.
I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety
that I feel at the ever increasing scope given to the Four-
teenth Amendment in cutting down what I believe to be the
constitutional rights of the states. As the decisions now
stand I see hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating
of those rights if they happen to strike the majority of this
Court as for any reason undesirable. I cannot believe that
the Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche to
embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions7 5
By the enlargement of its own power under the flexible and
indefinite provisions of the Constitution, the Supreme Court nar-
rowed the field of permissible state and national legislation at a
time when economic necessity was demanding government action
over a broader field than ever before. As a result of reading into
the due process clause a meaning not originally accorded to it
and clearly foreign to its English counterpart from which it was
derived, the Court, by the end of its term in June, 1936, had
stricken down state laws and acts of Congress until it had become
impossible for either government to deal effectively with the
major social and economic problems confronting the American
people.
An interesting paradox upon the two-fold limitations on gov-
ernmental power is to be found in two cases decided at its 1935
October term. In the case of Colgate v. Harvey,8 a Vermont
tax on interest received from loans made outside the state, while
certain low interest loans made within the state went untaxed,
was held invalid by a divided court of six to three. The ground
of invalidation was violation of that part of the Fourteenth
Amendment which says "no state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States." Never before had it even been claimed that
freedom from taxation was a privilege or immunity of United
States citizenship. In turning a deaf ear to the urgent pleas of
the three dissenting justices, Mr. Justice Sutherland emphasized
75. (1930) 281 U. S. 586, 595, 50 S. Ct. 436, 439, 74 L. ed. 1056, 1061.
For a discussion of this and similar taxation cases by the present writer,
see Howard, Recent Developments and Tendencies in the Taxation of In-
tangibles (1931) 44 U. of Mo. Bull. L. Ser. 5.
76. (1935) 296 U. S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252, 80 L. ed. 299.
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the necessity of denying state power by saying, "As citizens of
the United States, we are members of a single great community
consisting of all the states united, and not of distinct communi-
ties consisting of the states severally."77
Exactly twenty days later, in striking down the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of Congress as an invasion of state power, the
same Court by the same six to three division, and again over a
most vigorous dissent, found the nation-wide agricultural emer-
gency to be only the "similarity of local conditions" giving rise
to no national problem and neither calling for nor admitting of
national control.7 8
By denying national power, as in the A.' A. A. case, on the
ground that there is no delegation of such power to Congress
and on the further ground of an invasion of state rights, al-
though having to do with a nation-wide problem no longer ca-
pable of effective control by action of the individual states, and
by denying state power on the ground of limitations contained
in the Constitution, what has been aptly characterized as a no-
man's land in government was being marked by an ever widen-
ing boundary.
During this period of increasing limitations upon.governmental
power, the Supreme Court ruled on certain problems from the
standpoint of both state and national action. Perhaps the best
example is that of minimum wage legislation. In 1923, by a five
to three division, Mr. Justice Brandeis not sitting, the power of
Congress to so legislate for the District of Columbia was denied
as a violation of due process, in an opinion that has received
nothing but the most severe criticism.7 9 It is of no little interest
to note that an opposite result was twice prevented by mere acci-
dent. The first case which might have settled this problem was
that of Stettler v. O'Hara&,8" coming up from the state of Oregon
in 1917. For certain personal reasons Mr. Justice Brandeis
thought he ought not to sit in the case. The result was an even
division, four to four, affirming the Supreme Court of Oregon
in upholding the statute, but no opinion was written and it was
77. See 296 U. S. at 426, 56 S. Ct. at 257, 80 L. ed. at 309.
78. United States v. Butler (1936) 297 U. S. 1, 74, 75, 56 S. Ct. 312, 323,
80 L. ed. 477, 493.
79. Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394,
67 L. ed. 785.
80. (1917) 243 U. S. 629, 37 S. Ct. 475, 61 L. ed. 937.
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not regarded as a precedent for later cases. Had Mr. Justice
Brandeis felt free to participate, the decision would have been
five to four upholding validity and a precedent would have been
set.
In 1921, the Minimum Wage Act of Congress for the District
of Columbia was upheld by the Court of Appeals of the District,
Justice Robb being absent because of illness. Upon recovery, and
being opposed to validity, he sought a rehearing which was
finally granted, though a rehearing had been denied by the court
as constituted during his illness. The result was a two-year delay
in reaching the Supreme Court. In the meantime the personnel
of the Court had changed from what clearly appeared to be a
majority favorable, to a majority opposed, to its validity.'1 Thus
a second accident intervened to establish a doctrine of uncon-
stitutionality profoundly affecting the life of an entire nation.
2
Had Justice Robb of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia been able to participate in the first determination of
the case, the course of constitutional development would have
been fundamentally different, at least for the next fourteen
years.
In June, 1936, by a five to four division of the United States
Supreme Court, the power of the State of New York to regulate
wages of women employees was denied- as a violation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in reliance on the
precedent established by the District of Columbia case.
Another interesting paradox in Supreme Court adjudication
is to be found by comparing this New York Minimum Wage deci-
sion with that in the A. A. A. case decided at the same term. In
the latter case the majority opinion found unconstitutional coer-
cion in the offer to the farmer of a contract to reduce his acreage
in return for a rental or benefit payment under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, which the Court admitted he was at liberty to
accept or reject as might appear to his advantage. In the former
case, however, the same Court, by substantially the same division,
appeared to believe that an unemployed penniless widow with
81. For an excellent discussion of this whole matter, see Powell, The
Judiciality of Minimum-Wage Legislation (1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 545.
82. Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394, 67
L. ed. 785.
83. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo (1936) 298 U. S. 587, 56 S. Ct.
918, 80 L. ed. 1347.
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dependent children would stand on a plane of free bargaining
equality with the employment manager of a large corporation
and that their liberty of contract with respect to wages could
not be regulated by an exercise of the police power of the state.
The due process clause, according to five members of the Court,
required that that widow remain free to bargain for as low a
wage as she might see fit.
As asserted by Mr. Justice Stone in his dissent, "there is grim
irony in speaking of the freedom of contract of those who, be-
cause of their economic necessities, give their service for less
than is needful to keep body and soul together. '84
Equally striking, perhaps, by way of contrast with the finding
of coercion in the A. A. A. case is the Court's earlier decision
that a state legislature could not be permitted to interfere with
the free bargaining equality of the two parties to a labor con-
tract, when the employer, by his superior economic position, was
able to induce the employee to sign an agreement not to join, or
continue membership in, a labor union as the price of obtaining
employment.85
During the last session of Congress, Senator Borah introduced
a proposal to amend the Constitution by restoring the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to its intended and original
purpose to guarantee proper methods of procedure-the purpose
which it did serve before being given its present enlarged mean-
ing by the process of construction at the hands of the Supreme
Court. Thus the man who is widely regarded as the most ardent
and sincere defender of the Supreme Court and the Constitution
in public life today finds it necessary to amend the Constitution
to remove an undesirable and wholly unnecessary construction
which the Supreme Court majority has engrafted upon our fun-
damental law. Further, he asserted, he would like to restore the
word "person" as used in the Amendment to its original mean-
ing of natural person and remove the Court's application of it
to corporations, but he doubted the possibility of securing ap-
proval for that change.86
84. See 298 U. S. at 632, 56 S. Ct. at 932, 80 L. ed. at 1366.
85. Coppage v. Kansas (1915) 236 U. S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 240, 59 L. ed. 441.
Justices Van Devanter and McReynolds, and Mr. Chief Justice Hughes were
on the Court at that time. The latter, then an associate justice, concurred
in a dissenting opinion.
86. Introduced February 25, 1937. S. J. Res. 92, Dig. Pub. Gen. Bills,
75th Cong., 1st. Sess., No. 4, p. 52; New York Times, Feb. 26, 1937, p. 1: 8
and p. 4: 4, 5, 6.
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A principal suggested reason for this proposed amendment
was to remove from the Court's jurisdiction such state enact-
ments as the minimum wage legislation just referred to. The
proposal did not include application to the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment from which that in the Fourteenth was
copied, so that, had it been submitted and ratified, the Court-
created constitutional obstacles to similar legislation by Con-
gress would not have been removed.
In all of this discussion one must bear in mind what the Court
habitually asserts, that a strong presumption of constitutionality
is to be indulged, and a legislative act is to be held unconstitu-
tional only when the Court is inevitably impelled to that con-
clusion by the clear and controlling provisions of the Constitu-
tion-only when the measure is clearly invalid beyond all reason-
able doubt is it to be set aside by the Court. According to the
rather naive suggestion of Mr. Justice Roberts in the A. A. A.
case,
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the
courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the
judicial branch of the Government has only one duty; to lay
the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the
statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter
squares with the former.8 7
This he followed with the more reasonable assertion that,
When such a contention comes here we naturally require a
showing that by no reasonable possibility can the challenged
legislation fall within the wide range of discretion permitted
to Congress.88
Yet when the Justices, all presumed to be equally learned and
equally devoted to what they conceive to be the basic principles
of our Constitution, divide five to four, or six to three, and those
who dissent charge that the majority are assuming the function
87. United States v. Butler (1936) 297 U. S. 1, 62, 56 S. Ct. 312, 318,
80 L. ed. 477, 486. Contrast with this the statement of Mr. Justice McKenna
in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. (1917) 242 U. S. 539, 548, 37 S. Ct. 217, 220,
61 L. ed. 480, 488, referring to the police power of the states: "We get no
accurate idea of its limitations by opposing to it the declarations of the
Fourteenth Amendment that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, or denied the equal protection of
the laws. * * * A stricter inquiry is necessary and we must consider what
it is of life, liberty, and property that the Constitution protects."
88. United States v. Butler (1936) 297 U. S. 1, 67, 56 S. Ct. 312, 320,
80 L. ed. 477, 489.
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of a super-legislature, and substituting their judgment as to
wisdom and desirability for that of the body in which the Con-
stitution has reposed the policy-forming function, the ordinary
citizen is left confused. The introduction of the Borah amend-
ment is a practical admission that the charge of the dissenting
minority in these cases is not entirely unfounded.
Space does not permit a detailed review of all decisions in
which legislative enactments have been held unconsfitutional in
the past few years, but it appears abundantly clear that both
Congress and the state legislatures found it increasingly difficult
to cope with present day needs under the Constitution as inter-
preted and applied during that period by the Supreme Court
majority.
Whether the measures invalidated, both state and national,
were wise or desirable from the standpoint of social and eco-
nomic policy, or the opposite, is of no concern to the present
discussion. Suffice it to say that the constitutionally created legis-
lative bodies attempted to deal with problems considered by them
to be exigent, and power was denied, not because of any clear
prohibition in the Constitution, but because of considerations of
policy and desirability grounded on such indefinite provisions as
due process and general welfare.
It is, of course, familiar history that only two acts of Congress
were held invalid prior to the Civil War. One of these decisions
was of a technical nature and of minor importance in itself,8 and
the other, the Dred ScottOO decision, helped in a large way to
precipitate that tragic struggle. From an average of less than
one act of Congress invalidated every three years up to 1920,
and with a total for our national history to the present of per-
haps not more than about sixteen or seventeen major reversals
of Congress with respect to matters of social and economic im-
portance to the whole people, eight such major reversals occurred
in the period between January, 1935, and June, 1936.01 Thus the
89. Marbury v. Madison (1803) 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. ed. 60.
90. Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857) 19 How. 393, 15 L. ed. 691.
91. Perhaps no general agreement as to what constitutes such major
reversals could be arrived at, but the following cases occur to the writer
as proper to be included. The United States News for February 15, 1937,
in a front page editorial, fixes the number at sixteen but does not list the
cases. Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857) 19 How. 393, 15 L. ed. 691 (Missouri
Compromise); Hepburn v. Griswold (1870) 8 Wall. 603, 19 L. ed. 513(legal tender); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895) 157 U. S. 429,
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intense and widespread interest that has been manifested in this
problem during the past year or two is amply accounted for.
A brief resume of what has happened in recent years at the
hands of the Supreme Court majority presents highly interesting
data for study. If we go back to the two Child Labor cases 92 of
1918 and 1922, and the first minimum wage decision93 of 1923,
we find the background for the more recent adjudications. If,
however, we restrict our view to the more recent past and look
at that part of the N. R. A. decision,94 the Railroad Retirement
decision, 95 and the Guffey Coal decision, 9 which narrowed the
commerce power; the A. A. A. decision 97 which substantially
15 S. Ct. 673, 39 L. ed. 759 (income tax); Employers' Liability Cases (1908)
207 U. S. 463, 28 S. Ct. 141, 52 L. ed. 297 (employer-employee relation) ;
Adair v. United States (1908) 208 U. S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277, 52 L. ed. 436
(employer-employee relation); Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) 247 U. S. 251,
38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L. ed. 1101 (child labor commerce case); Eisner v.
Macomber (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189, 64 L. ed. 521 (income tax,
stock dividends); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (1922) 259 U. S. 20, 42
S. Ct. 449, 66 L. ed. 817 (child labor tax case); Adkins v. Children's Hos-
pital (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394, 67 L. ed. 785 (minimum wage);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935) 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. ed.
446 ("hot oil" case); Perry v. United States (1935) 294 U. S. 330, 55
S. Ct. 432, 79 L. ed. 912 (United States Gold Bonds); Raiload Retirement
Board v. Alton R. Co. (1935) 295 U. S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 758, 79 L. ed. 1468
(railroad pensions) ; Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States (1935)
295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 70 L. ed. 1570 (N. R. A. case); Louisville
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford (1935) 295 U. S. 555, 55 S. Ct. 854,
79 L. ed. 1593 (Frazier-Lemke Act); United States v. Butler (1936) 297
U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. ed. 477 (A. A. A. case); Carter v. Carter
Coal Co. (1936) 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. ed. 1160 (Guffey Coal
case); Ashton et al. v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1
(1936) 298 U. S. 513, 56 S. Ct. 892, 80 L. ed. 1309 (municipal bankruptcy).
There may well be some difference of opinion about the matter of in-
cluding Eisner v. Macomber in this list. It did constitute a major reversal
of Congressional policy, but its effect may be considered sufficiently unim-
portant to exclude it from such a classification. It will be observed that
eight of the remaining sixteen cases here listed were decided between Janu-
ary 1, 1935 and June 1, 1936. The immediate result of the holding of in-
validity in the case of Perry v. United States was not of such great
significance, but the constitutional question determined is, of course, vitally
important.
92. Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L. ed.
111; Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (1922) 259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449,
66 L. ed. 817.
93. Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394,
67 L. ed. 785.
94. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) 295 U. S. 495, 55
S. Ct. 837, 79 L. ed. 1570.
95. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Ry. Co. (1935) 295 U. S. 330,
55 S. Ct. 758, 79 L. ed. 1468.
96. Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936) 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80
L. ed. 1160.
97. United States v. Butler (1936) 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. ed.
477.
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destroyed the general welfare clause; the limitations in the
A. A. A. and Guffey Coal cases and the second Child Labor case
upon the taxing power; and finally the complete outlawry, though
fortunately not for all time, of any attempt, state or national,
to regulate wages, by the minimum wage decisions"8 of 1923 and
1936, to mention only the most outstanding adjudications, we get
the more immediate background upon which to base hopes and
expectations for the future. This was the background which
marked our progress up to the close of the Supreme Court term
in June of 1936, which had not been altered when, on February
5, 1937, President Roosevelt electrified Congress and the nation
with his judiciary reorganization proposal. Upon the basis of
this background, one was led to ask what the prospect might be
for the future. Several acts of the greatest importance were
awaiting determination of their validity by the Court, including
the Wagner Labor Relations Act, the Social Security Act, the
Public Utility Holding Company Act, many aspects of the
T. V. A., and the Securities and Exchange Commission Act.
Numerous other problems were urgently calling for some sort
of solution, among which might be mentioned the problems of
unemployment, slum clearance, reforestation, drouth and flood
control, crop insurance, farm tenantry, and other agricultural
problems, wage and hour regulations, the elimination of sweat-
shops and child labor, and no doubt others of equal importance.
So far as recently decided cases were to be taken as a guide,
there was no effective legal power anywhere, state or national,
with which to meet and solve most of these problems. In this
modern day, no democratic government can long endure that
cannot or will not find effective and constructive means of deal-
ing with the pressing social and economic problems vitally affect-
ing the welfare of the great body of its people.
Careful students of constitutional law have come to under-
stand that the Constitution of the United States means what the
judges say it means-and the judges change from time to time.OD
98. Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394,
67 L. ed. 785; Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo (1936) 298 U. S.
587, 56 S. Ct. 918, 80 L. ed. 1347.
99. "We are under a constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges
say it is * * *." From a speech by Charles Evans Hughes (now Mr. Chief
Justive Hughes) before Elmira Chamber of Commerce, Elmira, N. Y.,
May 3, 1907. Hughes, Addresses and Papers (1908) 139.
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With this definition of the Constitution before us, which for
all practical purposes must be the accepted one, it clearly ap-
peared that we were faced with one of the major crises in the
history of our government. Some type of change to relieve the
tension which had developed in the past few years seemed to be
a necessity. If the principles of democratic government are to
prevail, means of making effective the will of the people as set
forth by their chosen representatives must be devised. If present
day social and economic ills are to be intelligently and effectively
dealt with, legislatures, both state and national, must have
greater freedom from judicial restraint in which to experiment
with attempted remedies. The national government, it would
seem, must be given power to deal with economic problems na-
tional in their scope before which both it and the states have
found themselves helpless, and which, by their very nature, re-
gardless of constitutional restrictions, are no longer capable of
effective solution by action of the individual states. The proper
method of achieving that result is a matter giving rise to widely
divergent opinions, and should command calm and careful con-
sideration. There were many who had long believed that the only
real necessity was to restore powers to Congress which it already
rightfully possessed under the Constitution-powers which the
framers of that instrument apparently thought Congress would
have, powers which the early justices, including Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Marshall, interpreted it as having, powers which a minority
of the present Supreme Court have all along been able to find in
the Constitution-but powers which, in recent years, appeared
to dwindle away by the process of interpretation at the hands
of a recent Supreme Court majority.
The American people are fond of tradition and precedent. Par-
ticularly is that true of matters legal or constitutional. In that
field no other sources of authority are the objects of such uni-
versal veneration and respect as the intentions of the framers
of our Constitution and the opinions of Mr. Chief Justice Mar-
shall. Yet it would be extremely difficult for anyone to study
carefully the debates in the Constitutional Convention and read
with care the principal opinions of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall,
such as McCulloch v. MarylandlO and Gibbons v. Ogdem4,11 with-
100. (1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579.
101. (1824) 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23.
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out finding firmly embedded in both sources those principles of
governmental and constitutional power which would sustain all
acts of Congress held invalid in recent years by a divided Court.
And few, indeed, have been those measures of major importance
invalidated by the Court in this controversial period without a
sharp division.
If this broader recognition of the powers of Congress were
again embraced, and the Court should permanently recede from
its extreme interpretation of the due process clauses, thereby
curbing its own proneness to use those clauses as the bases for
striking down state and national legislation with whose economic
policy a majority of its members are not in accord, most of the
constitutional uncertainties that tied the hands of state and na-
tion in recent years would no longer seriously obstruct the legis-
lative path.
Prior to March 29 of this year, however, there certainly were
no indications that the Court was likely to steer its decisions in
either of these directions. Assuming, as it seemed one must, that
the Court as then constituted would continue to follow the course
it had charted in the preceding two years, all persons interested
in public affairs had come to consider what possible remedies
might be available.
Innumerable proposals found their way into the halls of Con-
gress in addition to the President's plan and the subsequently
proposed Borah and Eicher amendments mentioned above. Each
day the Congress remained in session seemed to bring forth a
new crop.
Three general types of remedies were suggested:
First, by Constitutional amendment to enlarge the powers of
Congress and modify the Court-created restrictions upon the
states.
Second, restrict the power of judicial review.
Third, convert the existing liberal minority of the Court into
a majority.
All had and still have their advocates, and all were met by
objections.
A brief survey of the major crises of a similar nature in our
past history, to observe how they were met, might not be inap-
propriate.
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The Dred Scott 10 2 decision, protecting the institution of slav-
ery, was overturned by the Civil War, followed by the so-called
Civil War Amendments.
The first Legal Tender'0 3 decision was reversed within two
years by the Court itself,04 after a change in the size and mem-
bership of the Court which has never ceased to excite contro-
versy. 0 5
The Income Tax Amendment was necessary to overcome the
five to four Supreme Court decision'0 6 which took away a power
previously held to exist. 0 7 This required a period of eighteen
years, fourteen of which were occupied in getting past the Senate
by its required two-thirds majority.
Lastly the Child Labor Amendment was submitted to the states
thirteen years ago because five members of the Supreme Court
narrowed Marshall's and the framers' conception of the com-
merce clause.
The first minimum Wage decision of 1923 might be listed,
which most students confidently expected to be overruled by the
Court, which, after a lapse of thirteen years, was reaffirmed by
a five to four division, and which was finally repudiated0 8 on
March 29, 1937, as a result of one Justice changing his vote.
All of these decisions, like the recent controversial cases, found
the court sharply divided.
The normal method of meeting the need for additional govern-
mental power is to amend the Constitution. To adequately
remedy the situation existing at the time under consideration
and prevent its recurrence in the future might well require
several amendments. It is no easy task to frame amendments
to remedy such difficulties, as is evidenced by the fact that ap-
proximately one hundred forty amendments were proposed in
Congress during its last two sessions, but there was no sufficient
agreement to bring a single one to the point of being submitted
102. Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857) 19 How. 393, 15 L. ed. 691.
103. Hepburn v. Griswold (1870) 8 Wall. 603, 19 L. ed. 513.
104. Legal Tender Cases (1871) 12 Wall. 457, 20 L. ed. 287.
105. See Ratner, Was the Supreme Court Packed by President Grant?
(1935) 50 Pol. Sci. Q. 343.
106. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895) 157 U. S. 429, 15
S. Ct. 673, 39 L. ed. 436.
107. Springer v. United States (1880) 102 U. S. 586, 26 L. ed. 253.
108. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) 300 U. S.-, 57 S. Ct. 578,
81 L. ed. -.
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to the states for ratification. Any amendment can be blocked by
thirteen states having less than five percent of the population,
and the slowness in ratifying the Child Labor Amendment in the
face of what appears to be an overwhelming popular demand, is
thought by many to mark exclusive reliance on the process of
amendment as a doubtful solution. When adopted, of course,
each amendment is subject to construction and application by
the Court, and some have been so unkind as to suggest that if it
now takes an amendment to remove what the Court engrafted
upon the due process clause and restore it to its original mean-
ing, history might repeat itself in the case of a new amendment.
To restrict the power of judicial review, though nowhere con-
ferred by the Constitution, is likely to come, and properly so,
only as a last desperate resort. Such a proposal, however, was
seriously urged at the last session of Congress in the case of the
so-called Wheeler-Bone Amendment"I empowering Congress to
override a Supreme Court veto by a two-thirds vote. And there
were other proposals directed to a similar purpose.
Finally, there has been the hope that, with the passage of a
reasonable time and in the ordinary course of events, a liberally
inclined chief executive would have the opportunity to fill a
sufficient number of vacancies to convert the Brandeis-Stone-
Cardozo minority into a majority. When and if that time should
come, and the dominant group on the Court will again, like Chief
Justice Marshall, study the provisions of the Constitution, with
a sympathetic understanding of the purpose and intention of its
framers, and rediscover as did Marshall that it is an instrument
of progress, a flexible and living instrument, "intended to endure
for ages to come and consequently to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs"-and at the same time restore the due
process clauses at least partially to their originally intended
meaning-then the protracted crisis of the past few years will
have vanished and our Constitution will again have become ade-
quate to meet substantially all the needs of a twentieth century
government.
Thus, in answering the question "Is Our Constitution Ade-
quate for Present Day Needs?" one finds the most important
part of the question to be, "What constitution do we have in
109. New York Times, Feb. 18, 1937, p. 1: 8, 2: 4; United States News,
Feb. 22, 1937, p. 3: 5, 6, 7.
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mind?" Do we mean the Constitution as it came from the fram-
ers in 1787, with the meaning they clearly thought it had; the
Constitution as interpreted and applied by the early justices of
the Supreme Court, and as during this controversial period it
has been understood by Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo,
more often than otherwise joined by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
making up a dissenting minority, and more recently joined by
Mr. Justice Roberts to constitute a majority in some very im-
portant cases? Or do we mean the Constitution as it has been
interpreted and applied by the prevailing majority during much
of the period dealt with herein? If we mean the former, the
proper answer to the question appears to be yes. If we mean
the latter, the proper answer appears to be as clearly no. The
change in personnel wrought by the substitution of Mr. Justice
Black for Mr. Justice Van Devanter still leaves the situation
uncertain, unless Mr. Chief Justice Hughes has made for him-
self a permanent abode with the liberal group on the Court. As
to this last suggestion, time alone can remove the uncertainty.
The question uppermost in many minds as the 1937 October
term of the Supreme Court gets under way has to do with the
proper appraisal to place upon the liberal decisions of the 1936
term and what course they portend for the future.
March 29 of this year will ever be an important date in our
constitutional development, as will also April 12 and May 24.
Upon those dates the Court committed itself to a group of deci-
sions of the exact type just asserted to be necessary if our Con-
stitution as it now stands is adequately to meet the needs of
present day government.
The Supreme Court majority, in recent years, over the bitter
protests of a vigorous dissenting minority, has encroached upon
the constitutionally-prescribed functions of legislative bodies,
both state and national, by asserting the power to pass upon the
wisdom and policy of legislative enactments. To use an expres-
sion found in dissenting opinions, it has become a super-legisla-
ture-thus constituting itself the ultimate legislative as well as
judicial authority whose acts are subject to no review and from
whose determinations there can be no appeal. In so doing, it has
fundamentally changed our system of government as created by
the Constitution. Whether the ill effects of that process of change
are now being permanently eradicated, it is too early to judge
with assurance.
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Fourteen years ago there was engrafted upon our fundamental
law what amounted, in effect, to a constitutional amendment, not
by the regular amending process but by the determination of
five members of the Supreme Court that minimum wage legisla-
tion was beyond the power of Congress in legislating for the
District of Columbia.110 Four of that five-man majority remained
upon the Court until the recent retirement of Mr. Justice Van
Devanter. The rest of the Justices are new with the exception
of Mr. Justice Brandeis. June 1, 1936, those same four Justices,
joined by Mr. Justice Roberts, held a similar act of New York
to be a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,"' and reaffirmed the doctrine of the District of
Columbia case. Less than ten months later, on March 29, 1937,
Mr. Justice Roberts joined the four justices who dissented in the
New York case the preceding June, to uphold the validity of an
act of the State of Washington112 almost identical in terms with
the Act of Congress invalidated in 1923. The majority opinion,
written by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, expressly overruled the
1923 decision. The distinction suggested in some quarters be-
tween these two recent cases by virtue of the difference in the
way they were presented, which allegedly renders them entirely
consistent with each other, is rather difficult to accept after a
careful study of the two opinions. The kindly concern of the
Chief Justice for the difficult position in which his colleague must
have found himself scarcely makes the suggestion more convinc-
ing.
In the light of these decisions, it is to be noted that what the
Constitution meant in 1923, and continued to mean on June 1,
1936, it does not mean since noon of March 29, 1937. The mean-
ing changed as a result of Mr. Justice Roberts changing his mind
between the last two dates. Thus was removed from the Consti-
tution the judicial amendment of 1923 by the same process by
which it became a part of our fundamental law.
In no other government the world has yet seen may one man,
holding the balance of power on a judicial tribunal, control the
110. Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394,
67 L. ed. 785.
111. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo (1936) 298 U. S. 587, 56
S. Ct. 918, 80 L. ed. 1347.
112. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) 300 U. S. -, 57 S. Ct. 578,
81 L. ed. ,
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vicissitudes of government and the social and economic life of a
whole people, as does the fifth man making up the majority of
the United States Supreme Court when the Justices are closely
divided upon some important issue. His is a greater power than
that of Congress, or of the President, or of both combined.
It is no easy matter to secure a reversal of a major decision
such as involved in the recent Minimum Wage case. Particularly
is that true when the earlier decision has been so recently re-
affirmed and when the reversal necessitates some member of the
Court making a complete about-face on the issue. Whether this
reversal of form on the part of Mr. Justice Roberts can be taken
to indicate a definite and complete switch on his part from the
conservative to the liberal wing of the Court is a question many
would like to have answered. Such a change would put him back
in line with his early performance upon the bench, when he
joined in upholding disputed state legislation in the Minnesota
Mortgage Moratorium case" 3 and the New York Milk case, 14 both
of which found the Court divided five to four. If such a realign-
ment should turn out to be permanent, and be maintained in like
manner with respect to other problems of due process, one very
important aspect of the present controversy might well be si-
lenced. The recent change in personnel definitely enhances this
prospect.
Other important decisions were announced on this same date
in March, 1937, but space will not permit their full discussion.
One other case in the group, however, must be mentioned, along
with the Wagner Labor Relations cases decided two weeks later.
This is the unanimous validation by the Court of the National
Railroad Labor Act"'5 as applied to the regulation of relations
between an employer railway and its so-called back-shop em-
ployees engaged in making heavy repairs upon locomotives and
cars withdrawn from service for long periods. While these em-
ployees were not actually engaged in interstate commerce, their
activities were held to have "such a relation to the other con-
fessedly interstate activities" of the railway as to be regarded
113. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell (1934) 290 U. S. 398, 54
S. Ct. 231, 78 L. ed. 413.
114. Nebbia v. People of State of New York (1934) 291 U. S. 502, 54
S. Ct. 505, 78 L. ed. 940.
115. Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40 (1937) 300 U. S. -,
57 S. Ct. 592, 81 L. ed. -.
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by the Court as a part of them, and all taken together as being
within the power of Congress over interstate commerce.
Even more significant for purposes of this discussion are the
Wagner Labor Relations cases 1 6 decided April 12. With the
exception of one case involving employees actually engaged in
interstate bus transportation," 7 these cases involved five to four
divisions by the Court, Mr. Justice Roberts joining with those
justices who dissented so vigorously when similar problems were
before the Court in the Guffey Coal2 8 and Railroad Retirement1
cases decided one and two years previously. Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, who also joined the liberal group in the Wagner cases,
had written the dissent in the Railroad Retirement case and had
partly concurred and partly dissented in the Guffey Coal case.
The Wagner Act, designed to eliminate industrial disputes and
industrial strife affecting commerce arising from the denial by
employers of the right of employees to organize, and from the
refusal of employers to accept the procedure of collective bar-
gaining, was upheld in its application to the relation of employer
and employee in the Associated Press enterprise-0 and in the
manufacture of steel products,' 2' trailers,2 2 and men's clothing.123
In each manufacturing case involved, there was presented the
normal and ordinary production enterprise commonly described
as local. The raw materials for the industry were drawn from
various sources without the state, and the finished products were
later sent in interstate commerce to markets in other states.
These manufacturing enterprises were not held to be parts of
116. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.(1937) 300 U. S. -, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed. -; National Labor Relations
Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co. (1937) 300 U. S. -, 57 S. Ct. 642, 81 L. ed.
-; National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing
Co. (1937) 300 U. S. -, 57 S. Ct. 645, 81 L. ed.
117. Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board
(1937) 300 U. S. -, 57 S. Ct. 648, 81 L. ed. -.
118. Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936) 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80
L. ed. 1160.
119. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co. (1935) 295 U. S. 330,
55 S. Ct. 758, 79 L. ed. 1468.
120. Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board (1937) 300
U. S. -t, 57 S. Ct. 650, 81 L. ed. -.
121. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp,(1937) 300 U. S. -, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed. -.
122. National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co. (1937) 300
U. S. -, 57 S. Ct. 642, 81 L. ed. -.
123. National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Cloth-
ing Co. (1937) 300 U. S. -, 57 S. Ct. 645, 81 L. ed. -.
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interstate commerce, but application of the statute thereto was
permitted because of the relation to or effect upon interstate
commerce of labor disputes in the manufacturing industry.
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes wrote the opinions. In the course of
one he used this very significant language
The congressional authority to protect interstate com-
merce from burdens and obstructions is not limited to trans-
actions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a
"flow" of interstate or foreign commerce. Burdens and ob-
structions may be due to injurious action springing from
other sources. The fundamental principle is that the power
to regulate commerce is the power to enact "all appropriate
legislation" for "its protection and advancement"; to adopt
measures "to promote its growth and insure its safety"; "to
foster, protect, control, and restrain." That power is plenary
and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce "no mat-
ter what the source of the dangers which threaten it." Al-
though activities may be intrastate in character when sepa-
rately considered, if they have such a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential
or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and
obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exer-
cise that control.* * *
The close and intimate effect which brings the subject
within the reach of federal power may be due to activities
in relation to productive industry although the industry
when separately viewed is local.* * *
When industries organize themselves on a national scale,
making their relation to interstate commerce the dominant
factor in their activities, how can it be maintained that their
industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden field into
which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to pro-
tect interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences
of industrial war ?124
One month and six days less than a year prior to the Wagner
decisions, the then Supreme Court majority outlawed as uncon-
stitutional the Guffey Coal Control Act 125 on the ground that its
labor provisions were not within the commerce power of Con-
gress.
In the course of that opinion, Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking
for himself and Justice Roberts, McReynolds, Van Devanter, and
124. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
(1937) 300 U. S. -, 57 S. Ct. 615, 624-626, 81 L. ed. -.
125. Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936) 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80
L. ed. 1160.
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Butler, asserted that trade, referring to commerce as he had just
defined it,
is a thing apart from the relation of employer and employee.
* * * The effect of the labor provisions of the Act, includ-
ing those in respect to minimum wages, wage agreements,
collective bargaining, and the Labor Board and its powers,
primarily falls upon production and not upon commerce.* * *
Production is a purely local activity.* * * The local char-
acter of mining, of manufacturing, and of crop growing is
a fact, and remains a fact, whatever may be done with the
products.
Much stress is laid upon the evils which come from the
struggle between employers and employees over the matter
of wages, working conditions, the right of collective bar-
gaining, etc., and the resulting strikes, curtailment and ir-
regularity of production and effect on prices; and it is
insisted that interstate commerce is greatly affected there-
by.* * * The conclusive answer is that the evils are all local
evils over which the federal government has no legislative
control. The relation of employer and employee is a local
relation.* * * The employees are not engaged in or about
commerce, but exclusively in producing a commodity. And
the controversies and evils which it is the object of the act
to regulate and minimize, are local controversies and evils.
* * * Such effect as they may have upon commerce, however
extensive it may be, is secondary and indirect. An increase
in the greatness of the effect adds to its importance. It does
not alter its character.26 (Italics supplied.)
It would be difficult to concoct language more all-inclusive than
that just quoted, or better calculated to close the door to any
possible reconsideration of the question in the future. Considera-
tions of the degree to which the local industry may affect inter-
state commerce can find no place in this reasoning. That same
reasoning would have been equally as applicable in the Wagner
cases as in the Guffey case, and four members of the Court so
applied it.
That the two decisions, and the opinions in which they are
embodied, are fundamentally inconsistent is quite obvious. Yet
the one did not purport to overrule the other.
The dissent of Mr. Justice McReynolds, speaking for himself
and Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler in the
126. Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936) 298 U. S. 238, 303, 304, 308, 309,
56 S. Ct. 855, 869, 870, 871, 872, 80 L. ed. 1160, 1185, 1188.
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Wagner cases, conforms closely to the Sutherland opinion in the
Guffey case and insists that that decision should control.
Every consideration brought forward to uphold the act be-
fore us was applicable to support the acts held unconstitu-
tional in causes decided within two years. And the lower
courts rightly deemed them controlling. 127
Many are the earlier cases with which the Wagner decisions
are fully consistent, but to which the cases of the past two years
restricting the commerce power are fundamentally contrary,
such as the second Coronado Coal case128 of 1925 applying the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act to striking miners in the same sort of
local industry as the miners involved in the Guffey case, or the
Second Employers' Liability Cases129 of 1912 to which a previous
reference was made for purposes of contrast with the Railroad
Retirement case. Many other cases might be mentioned.
The Wagner cases and the Railroad Labor case seem clearly
inconsistent with the Railroad Retirement case of two years be-
fore, and largely, also, with such earlier cases as Adair v. United
States"" and Coppage v. Kansas.- 1 Their reasoning conforms
rather to that in the Second Employers' Liability Cases of 1912,
and the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in the Railroad
Retirement case.
The direct and indirect test employed in the Schechter and
Guffey cases is clearly abandoned, and the dissent in the Guffey
case, so far as it deals with the same problem, seems to be sub-
stantially followed. The doctrine of earlier cases like Stafford v.
Wallace,132 upholding the National Stock Yards Act in 1922, the
second Coronado Coal case, just referred to, and many others
sustaining a power of Congress to regulate matters not a part
of interstate commerce, but related to and affecting such com-
merce in an important way"33--a doctrine seemingly departed
127. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
(1937) 300 U. S. -, 57 S. Ct. 615, 630, 81 L. ed. -.
128. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America (1925) 268
U. S. 295, 45 S. Ct. 551, 69 L. ed. 963.
129. (1912) 223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169, 56 L. ed. 327.
130. (1908) 208 U. S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277, 52 L. ed. 436.
131. (1915) 236 U. S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 240, 59 L. ed. 441. While this case
involved the validity of a state law and in no way concerned the commerce
power of Congress, its basic doctrines applicable to the relations of em-
ployers and employees are largely repudiated by these later cases.
132. (1922) 258 U. S. 495, 42 S. Ct. 397, 66 L. ed. 735.
133. Swift & Co. v. United States (1905) 196 U. S. 375, 25 S. Ct. 276,
49 L. ed. 518; Loewe v. Lawlor (1908) 208 U. S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 301, 52
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from, or at least definitely limited in the Schechter and Guffey
Coal cases-was, by these later cases, again asserted as the ap-
proved doctrine of the Court.
By largely repudiating the restricted commerce power doctrine
adhered to during the preceding two years and reasserting that
of the earlier period, the Court again placed itself in line with
the conceptions of the framers of the Constitution and of Chief
Justice Marshall as so broadly asserted in Gibbons 'v. Ogden,1"4
which have continued for the most part throughout our history;
the first Child Labor Case and the Railroad Retirement,
Schechter, and Guffey Coal cases being the principal departures.
Chief Justice Marshall, it is well to remember, excepted from
the power granted to Congress only that commerce which is
"completely internal to a state," and "which does not extend to
or affect other states."13 5 The distinction between direct and in-
direct effects he did not find in the Constitution of his day. That
was inserted from the judicial mind many years later.
A fitting climax to the memorable work of the 1936 term of
the Supreme Court is to be found in its Social Security decisions.
Taxing provisions of the Social Security Act were sustained
against contentions not greatly unlike those successfully invoked
in the A. A. A. case, that they were not in reality taxes at all;
not excises, lacking uniformity throughout the United States as
L. ed. 488; Southern Railway Co. v. United States (1911) 222 U. S. 20,
32 S. Ct. 2, 56 L. ed. 72; Second Employers' Liability Cases (1912) 223
U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169, 56 L. ed. 327; Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Goodrich Transportation Co. (1912) 224 U. S. 194, 32 S. Ct. 436, 56 L. ed.
729; United States v. Patten (1913) 226 U. S. 525, 33 S. Ct. 141, 57 L. ed.
333; United States v. Ferger (1919) 250 U. S. 199, 39 S. Ct. 445, 63 L. ed.
936; Duplex Company v. Deering (1921) 254 U. S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172, 65
L. ed. 349; Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant (1921) 257 U. S. 282,
42 S. Ct. 106, 66 L. ed. 239; Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co. (1922) 253 U. S.
50, 42 S. Ct. 244, 66 L. ed. 458; Stafford v. Wallace (1922) 258 U. S. 495,
42 S. Ct. 397, 66 L. ed. 735; Board of Trade v. Olsen (1923) 262 U. S. 1,
43 S. Ct. 470, 67 L. ed. 839; Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America (1925) 268 U. S. 295, 45 S. Ct. 551, 69 L. ed. 963; Thornton v.
United States (1926) 271 U. S. 414, 46 S. Ct. 585, 70 L. ed. 1013; United
States v. New York Central R. Co. (1926) 272 U. S. 457, 47 S. Ct. 130,
71 L. ed. 350; United States v. Brims (1926) 272 U. S. 549, 47 S. Ct. 169,
71 L. ed. 403; Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' Ass'n
(1927) 274 U. S. 37, 47 S. Ct. 522, 71 L. ed. 916; Tagg Brothers & Moor-
head v. United States (1930) 280 U. S. 420, 50 S. Ct. 220, 74 L. ed. 524;
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States (1931) 283 U. S. 163, 51 S. Ct.
421, 75 L. ed. 926; Local 167, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States (1934) 291 U. S. 293, 54 S. Ct. 396, 78 L. ed. 804:
134. (1824) 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23.
135. Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 9 Wheat. 1, 196, 6 L. ed. 23, 70.
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required by the Constitution; that the purpose was not revenue,
but an unlawful invasion of the reserved powers of the states;
and that the states, in submitting, yielded to unconstitutional
coercion on the part of the national government. 136 In negativing
these contentions and in finding old age benefits and unemploy-
ment compensation to be proper considerations from the point
of view of the general welfare,1 7 the majority,"8 speaking
through Mr. Justice Cardozo, left the A. A. A. decision in an
even more precarious condition than it originally occupied, and,
in effect, restored the general welfare clause to its original and
proper place in the Constitution. To many of us, not convinced
by the belabored opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts, the statement
of Mr. Justice Cardozo seems merely to assert the obvious.
Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that
were narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven
in our day with the well being of the nation. What is critical
or urgent changes with the times.1"9
As a matter of fact, the opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts in the
A. A. A. case, asserting the nation-wide agricultural demoraliza-
tion to be nothing but the similarity of local conditions, and na-
tional action in regard thereto to be an unwarranted invasion of
state rights, seems to be thoroughly repudiated by the newly
aligned majority of the Court in both the Social Security cases
and the recent commerce power cases discussed above. The whole
method of approach in these later cases is so completely different
as to appear to preclude the possibility of such decisions as that
in the A. A. A. case, and most of the other invalidating cases of
the two-year reactionary period herein under discussion.
The larger effect of these most recent cases seems to be to
136. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937) 300 U. S. -, 57 S. Ct. 883,
886, 887, 81 L. ed. -.
137. In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937) 300 U. S. -, 57 S. Ct.
883, 81 L. ed. -, and Helvering v. Davis (1937) 300 U. S. -, 57 S. Ct.
904, 81 L. ed. -, the Court upheld the contested provisions of the National
Social Security Act. In Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co. (1937)
300 U. S. -, 57 S. Ct. 867, 81 L. ed. -, the Alabama Unemployment Com-
pensation Act was sustained against the charges that it violated due process
and amounted to a surrender of state power by coercion of the national
government under its Social Security Act.
138. Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, and Chief Justice
Hughes. In the case of Helvering v. Davis, supra, only Justices McReynolds
and Butler dissented, and no dissenting opinion was written.
139. Helvering v. Davis (1937) 300 U. S. -, 57 S. Ct. 904, 908, 909,
81 L. ed. -.
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take up where the Court left off when the Railroad Retirement,
the Schechter, the Guffey, and the A. A. A. cases came up for
consideration, and to go forward on the basis of previous doc-
trine as though those cases had not been decided as they were.
None of those cases are specifically overruled, and no one can
be sure their doctrines may not be reasserted in some future
case and the doctrines of some of these later cases repudiated.
This is exactly what happened in the due process field when
Lockmer v. New York 4' in 1905 departed from previous consti-
tutional doctrines in an entirely indefensible opinion, only to be
repudiated in principle (not by name) in Bunting v. Oregon'4'
in 1917. The Lockner case doctrine was reestablished, appar-
ently, by Adkins v. Children's Hospital142 in 1923, the first mini-
mum wage case, which in turn was not only repudiated but ex-
pressly overruled fourteen years later.143
Like the basic doctrines of Holden v. Hardy14 4 and other cases
prior to Lockner v. New York, and Bunting v. Oregon subse-
quently decided, which are now reestablished by the latest mini-
mum wage decision, the doctrines of the Wagner and Railroad
Labor cases, and the Social Security cases seem to be eminently
sound-doctrines that reasonably may be expected ultimately to
prevail.
Perhaps when the time comes to view the recent past from a
more distant horizon, and one can look upon our constitutional
development over the broad expanse of our national life, the
reactionary decisions of recent years may assume the position of
mere temporary departures from what, for the most part, has
been a rather steady growth in the recognition of governmental
power adequate to meet the needs of each generation in its turn.
It is that prospect which stimulates confidence in the ultimate
and abiding success of democratic government in this country.
The extent to which that confidence may be justified may de-
pend in large measure upon the fundamental character of the
change that is now being wrought at the hands of the newly
aligned Supreme Court majority, and the permanence with which
140. (1905) 198 U. S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539, 49 L. ed. 937.
141. (1917) 243 U. S. 426, 37 S. Ct. 435, 61 L. ed. 830.
142. (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394, 67 L. ed. 785.
143. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) 300 U. S. -, 57 S. Ct.
578, 81 L. ed. -.
144. (1898) 169 U. S. 366, 18 S. Ct. 383, 42 L. ed. 780.
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that change is adhered to. As to what may have occasioned this
seeming fundamental change in outlook on the part of some mem-
bers of the Court, it is not the purpose of this article to discuss.
Whether it is to be at all permanent, no one can safely predict.
By all reasonable criteria, such a fundamental change in outlook
would seem likely to become permanent and far reachinig only
with further changes in the personnel of the Court. Until that
time shall come, however, the question stated in the title of this
article cannot be answered with complete assurance.
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